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Abstrac t 
Estimating Risk of Exposure to Bacillus anthracis based on Environmental 
Concentrations 
 
Tao Hong 
Patrick Gurian Supervisor, Ph.D. 
In many cases human health risk from biological agents is associated with aerosol exposures. It is 
suggested that concentrations found on surfaces may be used to infer future or past aerosol 
exposures. When these concentrations indicate that aerosol exposures exceed specified values, 
they would trigger response actions, such as remediation (to avoid future risks) or prophylactic 
antibiotics (to mitigate risks of past exposure).  
In this paper, two scenarios are modeled. The first scenario assumes a release of aerosolized 
Bacillus anthracis spores. This scenario is termed a retrospective risk scenario as the 
environmental samples would be used to infer past risk to occupants of the building. Analytical 
equations are developed a) to relate the past risk of mortality to the concentration of spores on six 
surfaces (1. tracked floor, 2. untracked floor, 3. walls, 4. HVAC filters, 5. ceiling, and 6. in nasal 
passages) that could be sampled after the release; b) to estimate the minimum sampling area 
required for negative results to establish that risks are below a specified level. The second 
scenario assumes that the spores are initially on a tracked surface. This scenario is termed 
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prospective risk, as environmental samples would be used to estimate future risk to occupants of 
the building as a result of re-aerosolization. Analytical equations were developed to estimate 
minimum sampling area and relate future risk to the concentration of spores initially present on 
the tracked surfaces.  
For the retrospective simulation, the risk of mortality can be linked with the concentration of 
Bacillus anthracis spores on a given surface without dependence on the room dimensions which 
creates a shortcut to estimating the risk level; for prospective simulation, the risk of mortality is 
related to the amount of spores released at the initial point and the dimensions and the 
characteristics of the room. The minimum sampling area has an inverse relation to surface 
concentration and particle diameter, which indicates that accurately measuring these risk levels 
for the smallest size fraction of B. anthracis (diameter of 1 µM) will be problematic. 
 
Key Words 
Anthrax, modeling, microbial risk assessment, bioterrorism 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Bacillus anthracis is an aerobic, Gram-positive, non-motile, spore-forming bacterial species which is the 
causative agent of anthrax, a potentially fatal bacterial infect ion. The bacteria will sporulate when the 
environment is not suitable for continuous multiplication. Bacillus anthracis spores are resistant to heat, 
ultraviolet, drying, and many chemical d isinfectants (Watson and Keir 1994; Dixon, Meselson, Guillemin 
et al. 1999). 
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A 
B 
Figure 1-1 Photomicrographs of Bacillus anthracis Vegetative Cells and Spores  
(Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999) 
A. Bacillus anthracis partially surrounded by the pseudopod of a cultured macrophage 
B. stain of Bacillus anthracis vegetative bacteria  
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1.2 Forms of anthrax 
1.2.1 Cutaneous anthrax  
Bacillus anthracis can enter the human body through the skin, by inhalation, or by ingestion and cause 
cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal anthrax, respectively. Cutaneous anthrax is the most common 
form of anthrax which  accounts for 90%-95% of anthrax infections all over the world  (Watson and Keir 
1994; Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999). Neck, head and ext remities are common infected areas (Figure 1-2) 
where infection may  in itiate after d irect or indirect contact with infected animals or their products, while 
transmission by insects after feeding on infected animal is rare (Pile, Malone, Eitzen et al. 1998). Antibiotic 
treatment is recommended for cutaneous anthrax which can almost reduce the mortality from 20% to 0%. 
(Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999; Inglesby 2002). 
 
 
Figure 1-2. Cuntaneous anthrax infection of hand and neck (Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999). 
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1.2.2 Inhalat ional anthrax 
Inhalational anthrax is less common. It occurs after spores entering the upper respiration system are 
engulfed and transported by alveolar macrophages to the peribronchial lymph nodes where the spores 
germinate and spread throughout the body in blood (Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999). Only 18 cases of 
inhalational anthrax were reported in the US in the 20th century, most due to occupational exposure, such 
as the meat-packing, animal hair-sorting and tanning (Hinton 2000; Inglesby 2002). The early diagnosis of 
inhalational anthrax is difficult unless there is a known outbreak. However, the onset of symptoms can 
occur after several weeks from exposure (Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999). It is estimated that aggressive 
antibiotic treatment could have increased the survival rate to 20% for people who suffered inhalational 
anthrax in Sverd lovsk (Meselson, Guillemin, Hughjones et al. 1994). 
Figure 1-3 Chest radiograph of a patient with inhalation anthrax (Inglesby 2002) 
Lobulated mediastinal widening (arrowheads) is present, consistent with lymphadenopathy, with a small parenchymal 
infiltrate at the left lung base. 
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1.2.3 Gastrointestinal anthrax 
Gastrointestinal anthrax is more common in herb ivorous animals than in humans and usually occurs in 
undeveloped countries as a result of ingesting undercooked infected meat. There are no records of 
gastrointestinal anthrax in the USA before 1999 (Dixon, Meselson et al. 1999) or Britain  before 1994 
(Watson and Keir 1994). However, 24 cases of oral-oropharyngeal anthrax were attributed to ingesting 
contaminated water buffalo meat in the north part of Thailand, and 6 infections are reported in Turkey in 
1986 (Sirisanthana, Nelson, Ezzell et al. 1988). Since the symptoms are not specific, d ifficult ies in 
diagnosing the disease may miss the recommended treatment period, which contributes to a relatively broad  
mortality rate range from 4% to 50% (Watson and Keir 1994; Sirisanthana and Brown 2002). 
1.3 Epidemiology of anthrax 
Accidental human in fection with Bacillus anthracis is very rare. It is estimated that there were only 2000 
cases worldwide annually in  1980s, and 80% of these cases were init iated by industrial exposure (Edwards, 
Clancy and Baeumner 2006). The largest outbreak in the USA happened in 1957. Nine (9) goat 
hair-processing plant workers were infected and 4 of them died. In 1979, 79 persons contracted anthrax and 
68 of them died because of an accidental explosion in a military laboratory in Sverdlovsk, Russia 
(Abramova, Grinberg, Yampolskaya et al. 1993; Meselson, Guillemin et al. 1994). Between 1979 and 1980, 
182 d ied of anthrax out of 10000 human infection cases in Zimbabwe; in Tibet, Ch ina, 162 deaths out of 
507 in fections occurred in 1989; and in western mountainous part of China, there were 898 human 
infections reported in 1996 with a 5% fatality rate, and 1210 human infections with a 3% fatality rate 
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reported in 1997. There are high numbers of human anthrax cases in Spain, from 152 in  1990 to 50 in  1996 
(Hughes-Jones 1999; Edwards, Clancy et al. 2006). Though the threat from accidental exposure Bacillus 
anthracis has been reduced with the improvement of industrial hygiene and development of vaccines, the 
potential of employing this Category A agent as a weapon causing massive casualties is evidently high. 
1.4 Bacillus Anthracis as a weapon 
Before 2001, b ioterrorism-related anthrax was a concern only in tabletop exercises (Bradley A. Perkins, 
Tanja Popovic and Yeskey* 2002). However, terrorists have since employed Bacillus anthracis as a 
biologic weapon, changing the realm of public health. Twenty-four days after the September 11 attacks, 
envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores (Figure 1-4) were mailed to news media companies and 
government officials separately, leading to the first bioterrorism-related cases of anthrax in the United 
States (Jernigan, Raghunathan, Bell et al. 2002). Four days later, a  letter containing threatening language 
along with Bacillus anthracis spores was opened in the mail handing area of a Senate office suite in the 
Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC (Weis, Intrepido, Miller et al. 2002). On October 15, letters 
filled with Bacillus anthracis spores were sent to media outlets in New York City through U.S Postal 
Service (USPS) located at Trenton (Greene, Reefhuis, Tan et al. 2002;  Heller, Bunning, France et al. 2002). 
These attacks caused the deaths of 5 people and cost hundreds of millions of dollars to clean the 
contaminated buildings (Scott Shane and Staff 2002). 
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Figure 1-4 Letters containing Bacillus anthracis used in 2001 terrorist attacks (FBI 2001) 
Why are terrorists using Bacillus anthracis spores as their attack method? Two main reasons have been 
suggested. One is that Bacillus anthracis particles can be readily obtained from scientific and natural 
sources, cultivated, possibly “weaponized”, stored, transported, and released as aerosols using a variety of 
delivery systems (Inglesby 2002); the other reason is the high mortality rate once people are infected. 
Inhalational anthrax is the most life threatening form with a 90–99% mortality rate if untreated while the 
mortality caused by cutaneous infection is within  the range 5-20% and gastrointestinal is 25-65% (Jernigan 
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2001). Bacillus anthracis is classified as a Category A Select Agent in the United States because of its 
potential to rapidly cause large numbers of deaths, significant societal disruption, and widespread terror 
within civilian populations (Reshetin and Regens 2003). The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates 
that a terrorist release of Bacillus anthracis spores from a s mall aircraft over a large city might expose 
100,000 people, cause 30,000 deaths, and cost over $25 billion in economic damages (Kaufmann, Meltzer 
and Schmid 1997). 
1.5 This thesis’ contribution 
It is generally accepted that we remain vulnerable to the risk of suffering another bioterrorist attack. 
However, the US lacks guidelines for a quick response to such attacks which will allow responders to 
estimate who were exposed during the attack and what level of risk these exposed individuals face; also we 
do not have standards for what is the safe concentration of Bacillus anthracis for reoccupation of a building 
after decontamination.  
There is a challenge to properly interpreting environmental samples. Human health risk is associated with 
aerosol exposures, but standards must be set for surface concentrations which could be employed as an 
estimator, since air concentrations quickly dimin ish to undetectable levels after a release. The aim of this 
paper is to develop analytical equations to find the relat ionship between Bacillus anthacis concentrations in 
the environment and human health risk. These results can enrich the knowledge base for confronting such 
emergency situations, including providing guidance on allocating resources towards those most at risk.  
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1.6 Prospective vs Retros pective Risk 
In this paper, I have focused on two scenarios in which indiv iduals may be exposed to Bacillus anthracis. 
One scenario is termed retrospective risk and the other prospective risk.  
For the retrospective scenario, we consider an individual who has been exposed to Bacillus anthracis 
spores which were released in the air of a room instantaneously. By assuming an average breathing rate and 
integrating the predicted Bacillus anthacis concentration in the air compartment over the exposure interval, 
I have estimated the likely number of anthrax spores inhaled. Next using dose-response models, I estimated 
the probability of mortality g iven certain exposure dose. 
For the prospective scenario, it was assumed that Bacillus anthracis has been deposited on a tracked 
surface, which corresponds to a post-event scenario following settling. The building is reoccupied, and the 
long-term risk to an occupant was evaluated. Mathematically this corresponds to changing the initial 
conditions to a release on the tracked floor and using the same model that had been as previously described 
for the retrospective scenario.  
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2. Model and Method 
2.1 General Introduction 
The model was built  based on a simple occupied office suite with a heating ventilation and air conditioning 
(HVAC) system as in Figure 1. The office was divided into 7 internal compartments: air, tracked floor, 
untracked floor, walls, ceiling, HVAC, and in  the nasal passages of an occupant of the office. The presence 
of mult iple occupants would not appreciably change the model results because only a small portion of 
Bacillus anthracis spores are deposit in the nasal passages (Figure 3-5). 
 
Figure 2-1. Schematic of model (side view) 
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The main  difference between  the tracked floor and untracked floor is that the spores deposited on the 
tracked floor are assumed to be subject to resuspension due to people walking over the surface, while 
organisms deposited on the untracked floor are assumed to be permanently deposited. In this study it was 
supposed that the proportions of tracked floor and untracked floor were fixed and there was resuspension 
from the tracked floor. In order to obtain mass-balance closure, another compartment was added to the 
system consisting of all areas external to the room.  
2.2 Fate and transport model  
The following system of linear first order ordinary differential equations was obtained based on the mass 
balance relationships among different compartments in the office suite: 
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Where 
Mair(t) is the Bacillus anthacis in the air compartment at time t. 
Mtf(t) is the Bacillus anthacis on the tracked surface of the floor at time t. 
Mutf(t) is the Bacillus anthacis on the untracked surface of the floor at t ime t. 
Mw(t) is the Bacillus anthacis on the walls at time t. 
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Mf(t) is the Bacillus anthacis on the filter at time t. 
Mec(t) is the Bacillus anthacis in the external compartment at time t. 
Mce(t) is the Bacillus anthacis on the ceiling at time t. 
Mn(t) is the Bacillus anthacis in people’s nasal passages at time t. 
Mair, Mtf, Mutf, Mw, M f, Mec, Mce and Mn are all given in units of spores (number of organis ms). 
Next the fo llowing parameters were defined 
Q is the discharge from the air compartment (computed from ACH assumptions). Units are [m3]  
λtf, λutf, λw and λce are the deposition rates onto the tracked surface, the untracked surface and the floors, 
walls and ceiling respectively. Units are [T-1] 
Vt f, Vut f, Vw and Vce are the deposition velocities onto the tracked surface, the untracked surface and 
the floors, walls and ceiling respectively. Units are [m/s] 
µ2 is the resuspension rate from the untracked surface into the air compartment. Units are [T-1] 
p is the fraction of air recirculated into the building by the HVAC system.  
e is the efficiency of the filter at removing particles. 
en is the efficiency of the nasal passages at removing part icles. 
Inh is the rate of the occupant. Units are [m3/hour]. 
V is the volume of model the room Units are [m3 ]. 
Note that the equation (2-1) can be uncoupled. We therefore solve the subsystem for the mass of Bacillus 
anthracis in the air and tracked floor: 
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The easiest way to do this is to work out the eigenvalues of 
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Denoted by D1 and D2 which is supposed are distinct eigenvalues, with corresponding eigenvectors 1,1υ ,
2,1υ , 1,2υ  and 2,2υ . The Gerschgorin test shows that the eigenvalues are non-positive which 
verifies that the solutions are stable (Varga 2004). The general solution to the coupled subsystem is then 
(Roman 2008):  
tDtD
air ececM 2,21,1 2,121,11 υυ +=                   (2-4) 
tDtD
tf ececM 2,21,1 2,221,21 υυ +=                   (2-5) 
Solving for the in itial conditions gives c1 and c2 for different scenarios, since all the spores are released in 
the air in reprospective scenario, and on tracked floor in prospective scenario (The detailed procedures for 
calculating c1, c2 can be found in Appendix 1): 
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Mutf, Mw, Mf, Mce and Mn are computed by integrating Mair. In the case that there is no resuspension so that 
µ2= 0, the equation for Mair uncouples from the equation for Mtf and can be integrated directly.  
2.3 Dose-response model  
Once the mass distributions are computed, I employed exponential and beta-Poisson dose-response models 
to estimate the risk to indiv iduals in a contaminated room (Bartrand, Weir and Haas 2008). The first step 
was to calculate the inhaled dose of Bacillus anthracis which was a product of inhalation rate, 
concentration of Bacillus anthracis, and exposure interval. Then I used dose response models to 
quantitatively estimate the probability of mortality.  
2.3.1 Exponential dose-response model 
If the dose of Bacillus anthracis spores follows a Poisson distribution and the dose response of each spore 
is constant, then the relationship between dose and risk follow an exponential function which  provides a 
favorable fit for Bacillus anthracis spores with particle size s maller than 5μm (Bartrand, Weir et al. 2008): 
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risk =1- exp(-r dose)        (2-8) 
where risk is the probability of infection, dose is the average number of inhaled spores, and r is the 
probability that a single organism will survive to initiate infection (Haas 2002). For Bacillus anthracis the 
end point from available dose-response studies is mortality rather than infection, and thus risk is defined as 
risk of death rather than risk of infection. When the product of r and dose is relatively small, a first-order 
Taylor series can be used to approximate equation (2-8) as: 
doserrisk  =         (2-9) 
2.3.2 Beta-Po isson dose-response model 
When dose response of Bacillus anthracis is variable and this variability can be described by a beta 
distribution, the dose-response relationship can be described by the beta-Poisson function which has been 
found to work well in predict ing dose response relation for Bacillus anthracis spores whose diameters are 
larger than 5 µm (Furumoto and Mickey 1967; Bartrand, Weir et al. 2008): 
),,(1 11 doseFrisk −+−= βαα       (2-10) 
Where α, β are parameters of beta distribution and 1F1(.) stands for the Kummer confluent hypergeometric 
function (Buchholz 1969). When α <<β and β>>1, equation (2-11) can be used as an approximat ion (Teunis 
and Havelaar 2002): 
α
β
−+−≈ )1(1 doserisk        (2-11) 
I related mass to number of spores by assuming that the average mass of 1 spore of Bacillus anthracis is 
7×10-13
 
grams (Reshetin and Regens 2003). At low inhalation doses, when dose<<β, we can approximate 
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the relationship between dose and risk using a Tay lor expansion in terms of α, β and dose or α, N50 (median 
infectious dose) and dose (Charles N. Haas 1999; Teunis and Havelaar 2002): 
dose
N
doserisk
)
12
(
/1
50
−
=≈
α
α
β
α
     (2-12) 
Since the init ial conditions for retrospective and prospective risk are d ifferent, these two different scenarios 
are considered separately in the following sections. 
2.4 Risk Scenarios  
2.4.1 Retrospective risks 
To estimate risk using a dose-response model, the inhalational dose during a short time exposure can be 
treated as cumulative dose: 
∫=
2
1
)( 
t
t air
dttCInhdose       (2-13) 
Where Cair(t) is the concentration of Bacillus anthacis in the room with the unit spores/m3; t2-t1 is the 
exposure interval for occupants in that room.  
A. Linking risk with the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on untracked surfaces 
All the surfaces in the office suite were classified into two categories: untracked and tracked surfaces. 
Organisms deposited on the tracked surfaces would then reenter into the air due to resuspension caused by 
activities such as walking o r cleaning. While  organisms deposited on the untracked surfaces were assumed to 
be permanently deposited. Untracked surfaces included: walls, ceiling and portions of the floor. 
(1) Linking risk with the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on untracked floor 
The concentration of Bacillus anthacis on the untracked floor is defined by the expression: 
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uf
uf A
M
C =         (2-14) 
Auf is the area of untracked floor on which the Bacillus anthacis is located; Muf is the number o f spores 
deposited on the untracked floor which can be obtained by integrating the rate of accumulating spores due 
to deposition over time (ta-tb): 
∫=
b
a
t
t airufuf
VdttCM  )( λ      (2-15) 
Since there is no resuspension from the untracked floor, the concentration of Bacillus anthracis on the 
untracked floor provides the time-integrated concentration of Bacillus anthracis in that portion of the room 
near the surface which can be seen by substituting equation (2-15) into equation (2-14):  
uf
t
t airuf
uf
uf
uf A
VdttC
A
M
C
b
a
∫
==
)(λ
     (2-16) 
The assumption that the occupants of the room have experienced the exposure from the beginning, which 
could be expressed mathematically as t1= ta= 0 and t2= tb. In this case, equations (2-13) and equation (2-16) 
can be combined to link the dose with the concentration on untracked horizontal surfaces: 
Inh
dosedttC
V
CA
air
uf
ufuf == ∫ )(λ  
This equation can then be solved for inhalation dose:
  
V
CAInh
dose
uf
ufuf
 
  
λ
=        (2-17) 
This assumes that the time limits of integration are the same for both the exposure period and the 
deposition period. In reality the surfaces would be expected to be continuously present while the occupants 
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of the space might not be. Thus the exposure estimated by this method will be conservative (health 
protective) in that it will tend to overestimate exposure for occupants who are not continuously present in 
the area. 
The deposition rate onto the untracked floor for Bacillus anthacis (λuf) is a function of deposition area, 
volume of the room and deposition velocity (νuf) (Thatcher and Layton 1995): 
 
V
Aufuf
uf
ν
λ =         (2-18) 
Thus equation (2-17) can be rewritten as: 
uf
ufCInhdose
ν
=         (2-19) 
At low doses, equation (2-19) can be combined with equation (2-9), the Taylor series approximation of an 
exponential dose-response function, to link the probability of mortality with the concentration of Bacillus 
anthacis on the untracked floor: 
uf
ufCInhrrisk
ν
 ≈         (2-20) 
If a beta-Poisson dose-response function is used, then equation (2-12) is used in place of (2-9): 
uf
ufCInhrisk
νβ
α  ≈        (2-21) 
At high doses the exact form of the dose-response model must be used rather than the Taylor series 
approximations, and we assume that the dose is accumulated over a single day (i.e. single release) which is 
reasonably accurate for the retrospective scenario: 
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uf
uf       (2-23) 
(2) Linking risk with the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on walls and ceilings.  
In order to use concentrations on the tracked walls to estimate risk, Cuf and vuf in equation (2-20) and (2-21) 
can be replaced by Cw and vw, in order to relate to risk: 
w
wCInhrrisk
ν
 ≈         (2-24) 
w
wCInhrisk
νβ
α  ≈         (2-25) 
For the ceilings, Cce and vce are used: 
ce
ceCInhrrisk
ν
 ≈         (2-26) 
ce
ceCInhrisk
νβ
α  ≈         (2-27) 
(3) Linking risk with the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on HVAC filter.  
For the HVAC filter, the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on the filter is defined as the accumulated mass 
of Bacillus anthacis on the filter divided by the area of the filter: 
∫==
f
air
f
f
f A
epQdttC
A
M
C )(      (2-28) 
Here e is the HVAC filter efficiency; p is the recycle proportion of the HVAC system; Q is the discharge of 
air measured in minutes. Combining equation (2-13) and equation (2-28) and we can find the link between 
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dose and Cf: 
Inh
dosedttC
epQ
CA
air
ff == ∫ )(
 
epQ
CA
Inhdose ff=         (2-29) 
Equation (2-29) can be substituted into equation (2-9) and equation (2-12) to obtain an estimate of risk as a 
function of the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on the HVAC: 
epQ
CA
Inhrrisk ff =        (2-30) 
epQ
CA
Inhrisk ff 
β
α
=        (2-31) 
While the following equations give the exact expression of probability of mortality  for an exponential 
dose-response function given the assumption that the exposure occurred in a single day: 
)(-rInh
e -1= epQ
CA ff
risk        (2-32) 
and for a beta-Poisson dose-response function:  
 )Inh1(1-1= -α
β epQ
CA
risk ff+
      (2-33) 
B. Linking risk with the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on tracked floor. 
The concentration of Bacillus anthracis on tracked floor is the net mass of deposited spores less 
resuspended spores, and divided by the area of tracked floor. However, the resuspension can be neglected if 
the concentration change of Bacillus anthracis spores on tracked floor due to resuspension contributes a 
small portion of the concentration. Unfortunately, consensus has not been reached for the threshold number 
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of portion under which resuspension could be neglected. For example, one might set a threshold that when 
the change of surface concentration due to resuspension is less than 5%, one can assume that deposition is 
the dominant process within that period. A conservative method of estimating loss to resuspension is to 
assume that all the spores are deposited at t=0 and that no redeposition after resuspension occurs. This 
method is conservative in that it will overestimate the loss due to resuspension and hence underestimate the 
time at which losses remain below the 5% threshold. Table 2-1 is calculated from equation (2-34) using 
different resuspension rates from the literature (Table 3-1). To determine the time durat ion at which 
resuspension will reduce a constant surface concentration by 5%. 
95.0= 
C
C
o
=− te µ       (2-34) 
Here Co is the total Bacillus anthracis spores’ init ial concentration on tracked floor and C is the Bacillus 
anthracis concentration on the tracked floor at time=t. 
Table 2-1 Resuspension period in order to change 5% of the total concentration 
Diameter (D) Time (t95) 
1μm 427hrs 
3μm 27hrs  
5μm 64hrs  
10μm 13hrs  
Equation (2-35) and (2-36) show the relationship between risk and surface concentration for two dose 
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response functions, exponential and beta-Poisson: 
tf
tfCInhrrisk
ν
 ≈          (t<t95)    (2-35) 
tf
tfCInhrisk
νβ
α  ≈          (t<t95)    (2-36) 
C. Linking risk with the concentration of Bacillus anthacis in human nasal passages. 
Since inhalat ional anthrax is due to exposure of anthracis spores through the respiratory system, including 
the nose and mouth, I have derived a relationship between the concentrations of pathogens in contaminated 
people’s nasal passages and the risk level. 
For people’s nasal passages, the concentration of Bacillus anthacis is defined as the accumulated mass of 
Bacillus anthacis divided by the area of the nasal passage: 
∫==
n
nair
n
n
n A
dtetCInh
A
MC   )( 
      (2-37) 
Where en is the nasal passages particle remove efficiency and An is nasal passage area. Combin ing equation 
(2-13) and equation (2-37), I have exp lored the link between dose and Cf: 
Inh
dosedttC
eInh
CA
air
n
nn == ∫ )(   
n
nn
e
CAdose =         (2-38) 
Equation (2-39) and (2-40) provide the relation between risk and concentration of Bacillus anthacis in 
people’s nasal passages based on exponential and beta-Poisson models when the low-dose Taylor series 
approximation is appropriate: 
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While the fo llowing equations give the exact expression of risk of mortality fo r an exponential 
dose-response function assuming the exposure occurred during a single day: 
)(-r
e -1= n
nn
e
CA
risk        (2-41) 
and for a beta-Poisson dose-response function:  
 )1(1-1= -α
β n
nn
e
CArisk +           (2-42) 
2.4.2 Prospective Risk 
In this scenario, it was assumed that the exposure time is five years and that there is no loss of viab ility 
over time since these assumptions will provide an upper bound on the risk to future occupants. Then, the 
risk was related to the concentration of Bacillus anthacis on the tracked floor under the assumption that 
spores from other surfaces are not reaerosolized and the anthracis initially p resent in the air has had time to 
dissipate. 
The prospective risk over a long exposure period is the complement  of the probability of no response from 
every single day exposure. Due to the intrinsic property of the exponential dose response function (equation 
2-43), the overall risk computed from independent daily  risk also equals the risk initialed from the same 
total exposure dose at one release, while at low exposure range, this approximation also fits beta-Poisson 
dose response function (equation 2-44):    
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In the prospective simulation, the overall accumulated inhaled dose is determined by integrating equation 
(2-13), the prospective equation for air concentration with equation (2-4) substituted for Cair: 
∞
∞
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When time goes to infinity (a health protective assumption as this maximizes the potential exposure dose), 
the inhaled dose will be: 
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Substituting c1 and c2 from equations (2-6) and (2-7): 
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The amount of Bacillus anthracis spores on the surface equals the product of initial concentration of spores 
on tracked floor and its area: 
tftf ACInit 0,=        (2-48) 
Equation (2-47) shows that the inhaled dose of Bacillus anthracis is related to the amount init ially released, 
the rate of inhalation, the dimensions of the room and the properties of Bacillus anthracis spores, such as 
diameter, which will affect the deposition and resuspension rate. Combing equation (2-46) with (2-9), risk 
of mortality was related to the concentration of anthracis spores for an exponential dose-response function: 
)υυυ(υ DD
υ υ)D(D
V
InhACr 
2,11,22,21,12,21,1
1,11,21,12,2
tftf,0 −
−
=risk    (2-49)  
Here Atf is the area of the tracked floor. Linking equation (2-46) with (2-12) yields the same relationship for 
a beta-Poisson dose-response function: 
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υ υ)D(D
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−
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In order to simplify the risk expression, a new constant Γ was introduced, the future risk coefficient: 
)( 
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     (2-51) 
Here Γ is a function of deposition rate of Bacillus anthracis spores, the filter efficiency, the recycle 
proportion and the discharge of the room listed in Table (2-1). Values for Γ for the model office are 
presented in Figure 2-2 and future risk coefficient for other building configurations could be computed and 
tabulated before an incident using values from Table 3-1 and 3-2. One could then use this constant in 
simple equations to estimate risk: 
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Figure 2-2 Future risk coefficient for different diameters of Bacillus anthracis spores  
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3. Application 
3.1 Model inputs and major assumptions 
In the following, I present simulations based on a hypothetical office equipped with a simple HVAC system. 
Discharge is based on an assumed value of 4 air changes per hour (ACH) and computed from  
 
60
 ACHVQ =  (in minutes)                   (3-1) 
The surface area of the filter is computed by assuming a flow rate of 450 ft/min (300 ft/min  -600 ft/min 
range is typical) (EPA 1997) or 137 m/min to the HVAC filter. Thus the surface area A of the filter is given 
by  
 137=
A
Q                           (3-2) 
I assumed a recirculation fraction of 80%. Breathing rate can be highly variable and depends on many 
factors including the health and activity level of an individual. I assumed a breathing rate of 1.02 m3/hr 
corresponding to medium activity (Kowalski 2003) . This is conservative for an office build ing where 
physical actives levels for many occupants are low. The probability of a single Bacillus anthracis spore 
initiat ing infect ion contains two stages: 1. probability of spores being inhaled by a person and 2. probability 
of inhaled spores initiating initiated infect ion. The second stage is controlled by different dose response 
equations for d ifferent size fractions and, as mentioned on page 25, the divid ing point is 5 μm. Due to data 
scarcity of information in the open literature, there was no 95% confidence range for the dose response of 
the larger diameter group, but it was assumed that the relative variance was the same in both groups which 
meant that the ratio between the base value and upper and lower bound values will not change. Based on 
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the above assumption, the range of probability of a single Bacillus anthracis spore initiating infection for 
larger diameter was extrapolated from Mitchell-Blackwood’s model (Jade Mitchell-Blackwood, Patrick L. 
Gurian  and Weir. 2008b). Model inputs used in the simulat ions are summarized in Tab le 3-1 and Figure 3-1 
describes the range of deposition velocity on floors and walls for various diameters. Table 3-2 list all the 
major assumption in this thesis. 
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Table 3-1a. Model inputs 
Symbol Meaning units Value Source 
V Room dimensions m3  5.6×5.6×2.5 
Assumed a typical office (EPA 
1997; RG Sextro 2002) 
Atf Area-tracked floor m2  5.6×5.6×0.75 
Autf Area-untracked floor m2  5.6×5.6×0.25 
Ace Area- ceiling m2  5.6×5.6 
Aw Area- wall m2  5.6×2.5×4 
Af Filter area m2  
3.82×10-2  
(2.81×10-2-5.62×10-2)  
Q/A = 137m/min  
(91-183 m/min) 
An Area of nasal passages m2  0.8 (Landahl 1950) 
f Proportion tracked   0.75 (ASHRAE 2005) 
e Filter efficiency   
D=1μm 0.098 
(RG Sextro 2002) 
D=3μm 0.49 
D=5μm 0.74 
D=10μm 0.88 
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Table 3-1b. Model inputs 
Symbol Meaning Units Diameter 
Input 
value 
Value scale 
Lower 
bound 
Source 
Upper 
bound 
Source 
Vu f, Vt f 
Deposition velocity on 
untracked and tracked floor 
m/s 
1μm 3.5×10-5 (Lai and Nazaroff 2000) 8.0×10-4 
(NRC 2005) 
(Riley, McKone, Lai et al. 
2002) 
6.9×10-5 
3μm 2.0×10-4 
(NRC 2005) 
6.0×10-3 4.2×10-4 
5μm 3.0×10-4 1.4×10-2 1.4×10-3 
10μm 7.0×10-4 2.7×10-2 5.6×10-3 
Vw  Deposition velocity on walls m/s 
1μm 3.5×10-8 
(Lai and Nazaroff 2000) 
9.0×10-5 
(Schneider, Kildeso and 
Breum 1999) 
3.9×10-5 
3μm 1.5×10-8 2.1×10-4 1.6×10-4 
5μm 1.0×10-8 4.0×10-4 3.1×10-4 
10μm 7.0×10-9 6.0×10-4 3.5×10-4 
Vce 
Deposition velocity on 
ceiling 
m/s 1μm    (NRC 2005) 6.2×10-7 
µ2 Resuspension rate s-1 
1μm 1.2×10-10  3.3×10-8  3.3×10-8 
3μm 1.7×10-7  1.7×10-6  5.3×10-7 
5μm 1.1×10-6  3.3×10-6  1.1×10-6 
10μm 8.8×10-7  9.4×10-6  9.4×10-6 
p Recirculat ion fraction    0 (ASHRAE 2005) 1 (ASHRAE 2005) 0.8 
ACH Air change rate   2.7 ACH=Q/V 5.4 ACH=Q/V 4 
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Table 3-1c. Model inputs 
Symbol Meaning 
Diamete
r 
Value scale 
Lower 
bound 
Source 
Upper 
bound 
Source 
Input 
value 
Source 
en 
Nasal passages 
particle 
remove 
efficiency 
1μm 0.02 
(Landahl 1950) 
0.25 
(Roger O. McClellan and 
Henderson 1989) 
0.14 
Midpoint of 
range 
3μm 0.22 0.68 0.45 
5μm 0.42 0.81 0.62 
10μm 0.62 0.91 0.77 
r 
Probability of 
a single 
Bacillus 
anthracis 
spore initiating 
infection 
1-5 μm 
9.1×10-7 
(95% confidence interval) 
(Jade Mitchell-Blackwood, 
Patrick L. Gurian et al. 
2008b) 
7.0×10-5 
(95% confidence interval) 
(Jade Mitchell-Blackwood, 
Patrick L. Gurian et al. 
2008b) 
7.2×10-6 
(Bartrand, Weir 
et al. 2008) 
β
α
 10 μm 
1.0×10-7 
(95% confidence interval) 
Extrapolated from 
(Jade Mitchell-Blackwood, 
Patrick L. Gurian et al. 
2008b) 
8.1×10-6 
(95% confidence interval) 
Extrapolated from 
(Jade Mitchell-Blackwood, 
Patrick L. Gurian et al. 
2008b) 
8.2×10-7 
(Bartrand, Weir 
et al. 2008) 
risk 
Acceptable 
risk level 
 1.0×10-5 
(Jade Mitchell-Blackwood 
and Patrick L. Gurian 2008a) 
1.0×10-3 
(Travis, Richter, Crouch et 
al. 1987) 
1.0×10-4 
Midpoint of 
range 
Inh* Breathing rate m3/hr 0.8 (Kowalski 2003) 2.0 (Kowalski 2003) 1.02 
(Kowalski 
2003) 
Q Discharge m3/s 0.058 (EPA 1997) 0.116 (EPA 1997) 0.087 (EPA 1997) 
* The value of * parameters contain health protective concern. 
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Table 3-2 Major assumptions in thesis 
 
 
* stands for the health protective assumptions. 
 
 
  
Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
1. For tracked surfaces, small amount of 
resuspension may be neglected when the 
time is small, because the surface 
concentration is hardly changed due to 
spores’ resuspension; 
 
1. Exposure time is infinite*; 
2. There is no die-off fo r Bacillus anthracis 
spores*; 
2. There is no die-off fo r Bacillus 
anthracis spores*; 
3. Spores are well mixed;  
3. Only Bacillus anthracis deposited on 
the tracked floor could reenter into 
the air due to resuspension; 
4. Occupants are exposured from the 
moment spores have been released*. 
4. All the resuspened Bacillus 
anthracis spores will reach human 
breathing zone*; 
Model application 
5. The dose-response function will not 
change over time*; 
1. Risk caused by different spore size are 
independent and they have a linear 
relationship at low dose range; 
 
6. At low dose range, the overall risk 
calculated from independent daily 
risk equals risk caused by 
accumulated dose over the exposure 
period; 
2. The concentration distribution on surface 
will follow either Po isson or negative 
binomial distribution. 
 
7. Once spores have been released, they 
are evenly distributed on the tracked 
floor*; 
8. Occupants are exposured from the 
moment of spores have been 
released*. 
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Figure 3-1a Deposition velocity on floors and walls versus various diameters  
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Figure 3-1b Nasal passage particle removal efficiency versus various diameters  
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3.2 Retrospective risk 
In this scenario, it was assumed that 1000 Bacillus anthracis spores were released into the air 
compartment. Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between risk of mortality and time, which indicates 
that risk increases rapidly  at first and then approaches an asymptote as the air concentration declines. 
Risk caused by particles with d iameters of 3μm, 5μm and 10μm approached an asymptote after 1.5 
hours while it took 14 hours for risk from spores with  diameter 1μm to approach its upper bound. 
Eight hours was chosen as a typical exposure duration for the retrospective scenario as this is the 
exposure associated with a typical working day. 
Table 3-3 shows environmental Bacillus anthacis concentrations corresponding to a risk level of 1 in 
1000 and Figure 3-3 shows the relationship between retrospective risk and surface concentration for 
an 8 hour exposure. Figure 3-4 shows the amount of initial release of Bacillus anthracis for different 
dose response coefficients and Figure 3-5 shows the fraction of each of the four size fractions of 
Bacillus anthacis in d ifferent compartments after 8 hours. Those figures indicated that the larger 
spore diameter, the higher tendency of depositing to various surfaces and being removed by the 
HVAC filter. As a result, more spores with larger diameters are required  to be released in order to 
achieve the same risk as smaller spores.  
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Figure 3-2. Retrospective risk versus time for an 8 hour exposure following  
an instantaneous release.  
(Release quantity is 1000 spores) 
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Figure 3-3. Retrospective risk versus surface concentration 
for an 8 hour exposure following an instantaneous release 
(Release quantity is between 1000-100000 spores)
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Table 3-3 The Environmental Concentrations of Bacillus anthacis Corresponding to a Retrospective Inhalation Risk of 10-3 (t= 480 mins).  
Diameter 
(μm) 
Amount of 
Initial 
Release 
Range 
Concentration (spores/m2) 
Tracked 
(Untracked) 
floor 
Range Walls Range Filter Range 
Nasal 
Passages 
Range 
1 1.4×104 
2.4×103 – 
1.9×105 
35 
9.0×10-1– 
4.0×103 
20 
9.0×10-4 – 
4.5×102 
9.2×104 0*- 1.5×106  26 
0.36 – 
3.4×102 
3 3.6×104 
2.5×103 – 
1.2×106 
2.1×102 
5.1– 
3.0×104 
83 
3.9×10-4 - 
1.0×103 
4.6×105 0* - 7.4×106  82 3.9 – 9.3×102 
5 6.4×104 
2.7×103 – 
2.6×106 
7.5×102 
7.6– 
6.9×104 
1.7×102 
2.6×10-4 – 
2.0×103 
7.3×105 0* - 1.1×107  118 7.5 – 1.1×103 
10 1.2×106 
2.6×104 – 
4.3×107 
2.4×104 
1.6×102 - 
1.2×106 
1.7×103 
1.6×10-3 – 
2.7×104 
7.7×106 0* - 1.2×108  1.3×103 96 – 1.1×104 
All inputs are based on Table 3-1. Range based on maximum and min imum of sensitivity analysis for all inputs except acceptable risk level(Section 4). 
Concentrations of Bacillus anthracis on the ceiling are not shown because no quantified ceiling deposition rate was found in the literature for a diameter larger than 1μm.
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Figure 3-4. The amount of init ial release of Bacillus anthacis for the best, upper and lower estimates of 
dose response coefficients at a given risk level (Risk Level=10-3) 
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Figure 3-5. The d istribution of Bacillus anthracis with different diameters after 8 hours in retrospective simulation  
  
Air 
compartment
Tracked floor
Untracked 
floor
Wall HVAC filter
External 
compartment
Nasal passage
1μm 0% 6% 2% 8% 24% 61% 0%
3μm 0% 13% 4% 12% 47% 24% 0%
5μm 0% 25% 8% 13% 40% 13% 0%
10μm 0% 47% 16% 7% 23% 6% 0%
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3.3 Prospective risk 
In this scenario, Bacillus anthracis is initially present on the tracked surface and the resuspension 
process causes the spores to reenter the air. Sampling is conducted to relate the amount of Bacillus 
anthracis present to the risk those future occupants of the room will face due to inhalation. Figure 3-6 
shows the relationship of concentration of Bacillus anthracis in the air and the time since Bacillus 
anthracis has been released which indicates that the concentration of spores in the air will decrease 
over time while, Figure 3-7 indicates the change of concentration of spores on the tracked floor over 
time. The concentration surge of large diameter spores in the first few days can be explained as the 
total resuspention consists of two parts: detachment and resuspention. Larger spores are much easier 
to be detached than small ones while they are slightly more resistant to resuspention than small ones. 
Overall, larger spores are easier to reenter into the air, but their concentration in the air will reduce 
quickly due to deposition and filter removal, while s mall spores have a lag time in resuspention but 
are more persistent (Zhang, Ahmadi, Qian et al. 2008). Figure 3-8 indicates the cumulative risk will 
increase until the concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on the surface has been depleted. Table 
3-4 shows the amount of init ially released Bacillus anthacis and the Bacillus anthacis concentration 
based on particular risk levels.  
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Figure 3-6. Concentration of Bacillus anthracis in the air against time for 5-year of exposure 
duration (Release quantity is 1000 spores) 
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Figure 3-7. Concentration of Bacillus anthracis on the tracked floor against time for 5-year of 
continuous exposure duration (Release quantity is 1000 spores) 
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Figure 3-8. Prospective risk against time over 5 years of continuous exposure 
(Release quantity is 1000 spores) 
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Table 3-4 The Current Environmental Concentrations of Bacillus anthacis 
Corresponding to a Prospective Inhalation Risk of 10-3 
(t= 5 years) 
Diameter 
(μm) 
Amount of Init ial Release (range) 
Concentration (range) 
(spores/m2) 
Tracked floor 
1 1.4×104 (2.9×102-8.9×107) 6.0×102 (1.2×101 - 3.8×106) 
3 3.2×104 (1.2×103-7.3×105) 1.4×103 (5.1×101-3.1×104) 
5 4.9×104 (1.8×103-1.1×106) 2.1×103 (7.7×101-4.7×104) 
10 7.6×105 (1.9×104-1.5×107) 3.2×104 (8.1×102-6.4×105) 
All inputs are based on Table 3-1. Range based on maximum and min imum of sensitivity analysis (Section 4). 
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3.4 Concentration standard for a mixture of particle sizes  
For both exponential and beta-Poisson models risk is proportional to concentration at low dose:  
siisi riskConc ,, =Ψ×        (3-3) 
where i indexes particle diameter, Ψ is constant of proportionality, Concs is the concentration value of 
Bacillus anthracis spores on a certain surface and riski,s is the level of risk associated with that 
surface for a given diameter.  
3.4.1 Computing risk from a mixture of different particle sizes 
Since the fract ion of Bacillus anthracis spores with different d iameters (fi) is 1. For simplicity, we 
assume there are four different diameters: 
105311 ffff +++=       (3-4) 
We assume that spores work independently in causing infect ion, and at  low dose range the overall 
risk has a linear relat ionship with risk in itiated by different spores. Those assumptions enable the 
validness of mult iplying equation (3-4) with risktotal,S: 
SSSS
stotalstotalstotalstotalstotal
riskriskriskrisk
friskfriskfriskfriskrisk
,10,5,3,1
10,5,3,1,,
+++=
+++=
 (3-5) 
Combin ing (3-3) and (3-5) a link could be built between overall concentration and individual 
concentration of different sizes of anthracis spores: 
lS
lS
S
lS
lS
S
lS
lS
S
lS
lS
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SSSSstotal
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,,5
,,5
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,,3
,,3
,3
,,1
,,1
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10,105,53,31,1,
+++=
Ψ+Ψ+Ψ+Ψ=
 (3-6) 
Ψ is the quotient of risk level and its corresponding concentration which can be calculated in  advance 
of a release since it will not change for a given scenario. lsiConc ,,  is the concentration of size 
fraction i on surface s, that corresponds to risk level l, and lsirisk ,,  is the risk level l for particle size 
i on surface s. 
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3.4.2 Computing standard of total concentration for Bacillus anthracis spores 
The total concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores corresponding to a particular risk level on a 
given surface is o f potential interest and in order to compute that value, totalΨ  should be calculated 
first from equation (3-5): 
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One can now solve for the overall concentration as a function of risk from equation (3-7): 
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3.4.3 Example: 
This example describes how to calculate the maximum tolerable concentration of Bacillus anthracis 
on the untracked floor in the retrospective scenario: 
Step 1. Define an  acceptable risk level and compute relat ive concentrations for different part icle 
sizes: 
We set risk1,utf = risk3,utf = risk5,utf = risk10,utf =10-3, and their corresponding untracked floor 
concentrations are: 
2
10,,10
2
10,,5
2
10,,3
2
10,,1
/ 75000,/ 6500
,/ 210,/ 35
33
33
msporesConcmsporesConc
msporesConcmsporesConc
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==
==
−−
−−
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Step 2. Measure fraction of each size distribution on a given surface after releasing 1000 spores for 
each particle size: 
Table 3-5 Fractions of Bacillus anthracis on untracked floor 
Diameter 
Untracked 
Floor 
Untracked 
Floor 
Spores/m2 (Percentage) 
1µm 2 6% 
3µm 5 14% 
5µm 10 28% 
10µm 19 52% 
Step 3. Calculat ing total risk via equation (3-6): 
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Step 4. Computing Ψtotal: 
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Step 5. Finding out 310,, −utftotalConc : 
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3.5 Minimum Sampling Area  
The surface concentrations corresponding to acceptable risk levels are likely to be very low. This 
raises the question as to whether a negative test result provides sufficient basis for concluding that the 
risk is below a desired standard. From a classical statistical point of view one wishes to reject the 
hypothesis that the concentration exceeds the standard with a sufficient level of confidence 1-α . If 
one assumes that the spores are distributed on the surface according to a Poisson distribution then one 
can reject the hypothesis: 
Ho: Concentration>C 
Given a negative sampling result when  
Prob(x = 0) = e−A C < 𝛼𝛼  
Where X is the number of organis ms, A is the area sampled, and C is the surface concentration. 
In many cases, there is a  minimum number of required  for detection of the microorganisms, the 
detection limit (DL, assumed here to be 10 spores for PCR to detect B. anthracis). It was assumed 
that the distribution of spores on different surfaces has a Poisson distribution (Teunis and Havelaar 
2002): 
Prob(x<DL) <α        (3-8) 
∑ e−�A  C � �A  C �xx !DL −1x =0 < 𝛼𝛼      (3-9) 
DL=10, α=0.05 
A C≥15.98 
Besides a Poisson distribution, a negative binomial d istribution, which is a mixtu re of a gamma 
distribution and a Po isson distribution, also could be employed to describe the spores’ distribution on 
a surface after a release (Charles N. Haas 1999).  
kx
NB )CA
kCA()
kCA
CA(
Γ(k)x!
k)Γ(x(x)P −+
+
+
=     (3-10) 
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Figure 3-9 presents the probability of sampling spores less than the detection limit  versus the product 
of surface concentration and sampling area for d ifferent distributions. Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 show 
the minimum sampling area calculated based on these assumptions. 
 
Figure 3-9. Probability of sampling spores less than detection limit versus the product of surface 
concentration and sampling area for d ifferent distributions 
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Table 3-6 Min imum sampling area for retrospective exposure estimation  
(t=480 mins, unit is m2) 
Distribution 
Diameter 
(μm)  
Tracked (Untracked) 
floor 
Range Walls  Range* Filter Range 
Nasal 
Passages  
Range 
Poisson 
 
1 4.6×10-1 4.0×10-3 – 1.8×101 8.0×10-1 3.6×10-2 – 1.8×104 1.7×10-4 1.1×10-5- inf* 6.2×10-1 4.7×10-2– 4.4×101 
3 7.6×10-2 5.3×10-4 – 3.1×100 1.9×10-1 1.6×10-2 – 4.1×104 3.5×10-5 2.2×10-6 – inf* 2.0×10-1 1.7×10-2 – 4.1×100 
5 2.1×10-2 2.3×10-4– 2.1×100 9.4×10-2 8.0×10-3 – 6.2×104 2.2×10-5 1.5×10-6 – inf* 1.4×10-1 1.5×10-2 – 2.1×100 
10 6.7×10-4 1.3×10-5- 1.0×10-1 9.4×10-3 5.9×10-4 – 1.0×104 2.1×10-6 1.3×10-7 – inf* 1.2×10-2 1.5×10-3 – 1.7×10-1 
Negative 
Binomial 
k=0.5 
1 7.1×101 6.2×10-1-2.7×103 1.2×102 5.5×100 – 2.8×106 2.7×10-2 1.7×10-3- inf* 9.5×101 7.3×100– 6.9×103 
3 1.2×101 8.3×10-2-4.9×102 3.0×101 2.5×100 – 6.4×106 5.4×10-3 3.4×10-4 – inf* 3.0×101 2.7×100 – 6.4×102 
5 3.3×100 3.6×10-2-3.3×102 1.5×101 1.2×100 – 9.5×106 3.4×10-3 2.3×10-4 – inf* 2.1×101 2.3×100 – 3.3×102 
10 1.0×10-1 2.1×10-3-1.6×101 1.5×100 9.2×10-2 – 1.6×106 3.2×10-4 2.1×10-5 – inf* 1.9×100 2.3×10-1 – 2.6×101 
  inf-infinite  
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Table 3-6 Min imum sampling area for retrospective exposure estimation (continued) 
(t=480 mins, unit is m2) 
Distribution 
Diameter 
(μm)  
Tracked (Untracked) floor Range Walls  Range* Filter Range Nasal Passages  Range 
Negative Binomial 
k=1 
1 5.5×100 4.9×10-2 – 2.2×102 9.7×100 4.3×10-1 – 2.2×105 2.1×10-3 1.3×10-4- inf 7.5×100 5.7×10-1– 5.4×102 
3 9.2×10-1 6.5×10-3 – 3.8×101 2.3×100 1.9×10-1 – 5.0×105 4.2×10-4 2.6×10-5 – inf 2.4×100 2.1×10-1 – 5.0×101 
5 2.6×10-1 2.8×10-3– 2.6×101 1.1×100 9.7×10-2 – 7.5×105 2.7×10-4 1.8×10-5 – inf 1.6×100 1.8×10-1 – 2.6×101 
10 8.1×10-3 1.6×10-4- 1.2×100 1.1×101 7.2×10-3 – 1.2×105 2.5×10-5 1.6×10-6 – inf 1.5×10-1 1.8×10-2 – 2.0×100 
Negative Binomial 
k=100 
1 4.7×10-1 4.1×10-3 – 1.8×101 8.3×10-1 3.7×10-2 – 1.8×104 1.8×10-4 1.1×10-5- inf 6.4×10-1 4.9×10-2– 4.6×101 
3 9.2×10-1 5.5×10-4 – 3.2×100 2.0×10-1 1.7×10-2 – 4.2×104 3.6×10-5 2.2×10-6 – inf 2.0×10-1 1.8×10-2 – 4.2×100 
5 2.6×10-1 2.4×10-4– 2.2×100 9.7×10-2 8.3×10-3 – 6.4×104 2.3×10-5 1.5×10-6 – inf 1.4×10-1 1.5×10-2 – 2.2×100 
10 8.1×10-3 1.4×10-5- 1.0×10-1 9.7×10-3 6.1×10-4 – 1.0×104 2.1×10-6 1.4×10-7 – inf 1.3×10-2 1.5×10-3 – 1.7×10-1 
Ceiling as a sampling area is not shown due to its low concentration which requires a large sampling area which is difficu lt to achieve. 
The maximum sampling area for walls is also unrealistically large due to its relative low concentration. 
The min imum sampling area for tracked floor and untracked floor are the same which is due to the almost identical surface concentrations caused by neglectable resuspension. 
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Table 3-7 Min imum sampling area for prospective exposure estimat ion 
(time=5 years, unit is m2) 
Distribution 
Diameter 
(μm)  
Tracked floor Range Distribution 
Diameter 
(μm)  
Tracked floor Range 
Poisson 
1 2.7×10-2 4.2×10-6 – 1.3×100 
Negative Binomial 
k=0.5 
1 4.2×100 6.6×10-4 – 2.0×102 
3 1.2×10-2 5.1×10-4 – 3.1×10-1 3 1.8×100 8.0×10-2 – 4.9×101 
5 7.6×10-3 3.4×10-4– 2.1×10-1 5 1.2×100 5.3×10-2– 3.2×101 
10 4.9×10-4 2.5×10-5- 2.0×10-2 10 7.7×10-2 3.9×10-3- 3.1×100 
Negative Binomial 
k=1 
1 3.3×10-1 5.1×10-5 – 1.6×101 
Negative Binomial 
k=100 
1 2.8×10-2 4.4×10-6 – 1.3×100 
3 1.4×10-1 6.3×10-3 – 3.8×100 3 1.2×10-2 5.3×10-4 – 3.2×10-1 
5 9.3×10-2 4.1×10-3– 2.5×100 5 7.9×10-3 3.5×10-4– 2.2×10-1 
10 6.0×10-3 3.0×10-4- 2.4×10-1 10 5.1×10-4 2.6×10-5- 2.0×10-2 
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4. Sensitivity Analysis 
The mortality rate for people exposed to Bacillus anthracis spores is affected by many parameters 
including surface concentration of anthracis spores, human inhalation rate, d imensions of the office 
suite, deposition velocities of anthracis spores, Bacillus anthracis’ dose response, and properties of 
the HVAC system. In order to better understand the impact of these many factors and identify 
dominant parameters, I carried out a sensitivity analysis. Tornado diagrams were used to visualize the 
result of the analysis. 
In the following, sensitivity analysis was applied to both retrospective and prospective scenarios, in 
order to investigate how potential concentration standards for anthracis spores on various surfaces 
(only the tracked surface is analyzed in the prospective scenario) were affected by uncertainty in the 
variety of inputs. The ranges used in the sensitivity analysis are given in Tables 3-1 and 3-2. Note that 
risk, which was an output in Chapter 3, is an  input here, as one wishes to determine the sensitivity of 
an allowable concentration standard to a number of factors, including the allowable risk level. Risk 
focused goals have not been precisely defined for B.anthracis. A broad range of 10-3 to 10-5 is used to 
reflect this fact. The upper bound of 10-3 is roughly the upper bound for unregulated lifetime cancer 
risks (Travis, Richter et al. 1987). However, microbial risk may be valued differently, part icularly risk 
associated with a single release. The lower bound of 10-5 is the upper end of the range of 10-7 to 10-5 
which has been proposed for demin imis risk for small populations and is in line with preliminary 
estimations of the lower bound for the risk at which prophylactic antibiotic use passes a benefit-cost 
test (Jade Mitchell-Blackwood and Patrick L. Gurian 2008a). 
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4.1 Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on untracked floor in retrospective scenario 
The concentration of spores on the untracked floor can be derived directly from equation (2-20) using 
the input value ranges in Tables 3-1 and 3-2: 
Inhr
vrisk
C ufuf  
 
≈        (4-1) 
Figure 4-1 consists of a tornado diagram which present the results of sensitive analyses based on 
uncertainties in deposition velocity (different diameters), risk level, inhalation rate, and Bacillus 
anthracis’ dose response coefficient. The deposition velocity in Figure 4-1a is a general one (the 
composition of anthracis spores is 20% of 1μm, 30% of 3μm, 30% of 5μm, and 20% of 10μm) while 
the deposition velocities in Figure 4-1b, c, d, and e are based on diameters of 3μm, 5μm, and 10μm, 
respectively.Since the resuspension effect is negligible in the retrospective scenario, the results in 
Figure 4-1 are also applicable to the tracked floor. 
 
A. One-way Tornado Graph for Cuf (mixtu re)  
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B. One-way Tornado Graph for Cuf (1 μm)  
 
 
 
C. One-way Tornado Graph for Cuf (3 μm)  
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D. One-way Tornado Graph for Cuf (5 μm)  
 
 
E. One-way Tornado Graph for Cuf (10 μm) 
 
Figure 4-1 Tornado Diagram for concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on untracked floor 
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4.2 Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on walls in retros pective scenario 
Similar to the concentration on the untracked floor, the concentration on the walls can be derived 
directly from equation (2-28) using the input value ranges in Tables 3-1 and 3-2: 
Inhr
vriskC ww  
 
≈         (4-2) 
Figure 4-2 presents the results of a sensitivity analysis based on deposition velocity (different 
diameters), risk level, inhalat ion rate and Bacillus anthracis’ dose response. The deposition velocity 
in Figure 4-2a is a  general one (the composition of Bacillus anthracis spores is 20% of 1μm, 30% of 
3μm, 30% of 5μm, and 20% of 10μm) while the deposition velocities in Figure 4-2b, c , d, and e are 
based on diameters of 3μm, 5μm, and 10μm respectively. 
 
A. One-way Tornado Graph for Cw (mixture)  
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B. One-way Tornado Graph for Cw (1 μm)  
 
 
 
C. One-way Tornado Graph for Cw (3 μm)  
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D. One-way Tornado Graph for Cw (5 μm) 
 
E. One-way Tornado Graph for Cw (10 μm)  
 
Figure 4-2 Tornado Diagram for Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on walls 
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4.3 Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on HVAC filter in retros pective scenario 
The concentration on the walls can be derived directly from equation (2-34) and the ranges used in 
the sensitivity analysis are given in Tables 3-1 and 3-2: 
f
f AInhr
QperiskC
  
   
≈         (4-3) 
Figure 4-3 presents the result of a sensitivity analysis on HVAC filter efficiency (different diameters), 
risk level, inhalation rate, Bacillus anthracis’ infectivity, air change rate, and recycle proportion of 
HVAC system. The HVAC filter efficiency in Figure 4-3a is a general one (the composition of 
Bacillus anthracis spores is 20% of 1μm, 30% of 3μm, 30% of 5μm, and 20% of 10μm) while the 
deposition velocities in Figure 4-2b, c, d, and e are based on diameters of 3μm, 5μm, and 10μm 
respectively. 
 
A. One-way Tornado Graph for Cf (mixture)  
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B. One-way Tornado Graph for Cf (1μm)  
 
C. One-way Tornado Graph for Cf (3μm)  
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D. One-way Tornado Graph for Cf (5μm)  
 
 
E. One-way Tornado Graph for Cf (10μm)  
Figure 4-3 Tornado Diagram for Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on HVAC filter 
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4.4 Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores in nasal passages in retrospective scenario 
The concentration in nasal passages can be derived directly from equation (2-44), and the parameter 
ranges used in the sensitivity analysis are given in Tables 3-1 and 3-2: 
n
n
n Ar
eriskC
 
 
≈        (4-4) 
Figure 4-4 presents the results of a sensitivity analysis on nasal concentration (different diameters), 
risk level, and Bacillus anthracis’ infectivity. The nasal passages particle removal efficiency in  
Figure 4-4a is a general one (the composition of Bacillus anthracis spores is 20% of 1μm, 30% of 
3μm, 30% of 5μm, and 20% of 10μm) while the deposition velocities in Figure 4-2b, c , d, and e are 
based on diameters of 3μm, 5μm, and 10μm respectively. 
 
A. One-way Tornado Graph for Cn (mixture)  
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B. One-way Tornado Graph for Cn (1 μm)  
C. One-way Tornado Graph for Cn (3 μm)  
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D. One-way Tornado Graph for Cn (5 μm)  
 
E. One-way Tornado Graph for Cn (10 μm)  
 
Figure 4-4 Tornado Diagram for Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores in nasal passages 
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4.5 Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on tracked floor in pros pective scenario for a 
given risk level 
The reason for selecting the tracked floor as the only subject for sensitivity analysis is because this is 
the only surface presenting a prospective risk. Due to its relatively greater complexity than the 
retrospective situation, the system of equations describing the whole process were solved rather than 
the separate equations for each surface used in the retrospective scenario. The following parameters’ 
individual impact on the concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on the tracked floor given a 
specified risk level are presented in Figure 4-5 in the form of a Tornado graph: acceptable risk level, 
spores’ deposition velocity to the wall and floor, spores’ resuspension rate, air change rate, breathing 
rate, Bacillus anthracis’ dose response coefficient and recirculation fraction. 
 
A. One-way Tornado Graph for Ctf (1 μm)  
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B. One-way Tornado Graph for Ctf (3 μm) 
 
C. One-way Tornado Graph for Ctf  (5 μm) 
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D. One-way Tornado Graph for Ctf (10 μm) 
 
Figure 4-5 Tornado Diagram for Concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores on tracked floor in 
prospective scenario 
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5. Model Comparison 
By inputting the parameters used in the paper “Modeling the spread of anthrax in build ings” (RG 
Sextro  2002), it was successfully demonstrated that the fate and transport model used in this thesis is 
in accord  with a model developed by researchers at a  national laboratory who have extensive 
experience in  the fate and transport of particu lates in the indoor environment. Tab le 5-1a presents the 
parameters used in Sextro ’s paper; however, the authors do not specify the proportion of Bacillus 
anthracis spores with d ifferent diameters, the proportion of t racked floor of the whole floor area, and 
air flow rate. In  our validation, I fitted the model by changing the fraction of released anthracis in 
various locations and seeking the smallest sum of squared error s (Equation 5-1) between Sext ro’s 
paper  and mine (Table 5-2) for the mass fraction on various surfaces. The optimization results are 
shown in Table 5-1b and Figure 5-1. 
∑ −=
SurfacesDifferent 
2)paper sSextro' fromFraction  MassModel fromFraction  Mass(DifferenceError  Square  (5-1) 
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Table 5-1a Parameters specified in Sextro ’s paper 
Symbol Meaning units Value 
V Room dimensions m3  5.0×4.0×4.0 
Atf Area-tracked floor m2  5.0×4.0×0.83 
Autf Area-untracked floor m2  5.0×4.0×0.17 
Aw Area- wall m2  4.0×2×(5.0+4.0) 
Af Filter area m2  0.0146 
ACH 
Air changes per hour 
(with HVAC) 
 6 
Q 
Discharge 
(with HVAC) 
m3/min 2 
Inh Breathing rate L/min  20 
µ2 Resuspension rate hr-1 
D=1μm 1.2×10-4 
D=3μm 1.9×10-3 
D=5μm 0.8×10-3 
 D=10μm 0.4×10-2 
λf Deposition rate on floor hr-1 
D=1μm 0.1 
D=3μm 0.6 
D=5μm 2 
 D=10μm 8.1 
λw Deposition rate on walls hr-1 
D=1μm 0.1 
D=3μm 0.4 
D=5μm 0.8 
 D=10μm 0.9 
e Filter efficiency   
D=1μm 0.098 
D=3μm 0.49 
D=5μm 0.74 
 D=10μm 0.88 
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Table 5-1b Parameters unspecified in Sext ro’s paper which were estimated by model fitting 
procedure 
Symbol Meaning units Value 
fr1 
Proportion of particles with 
diameter of 1μm 
 0.32 
fr3 
Proportion of particles with 
diameter of 3μm 
 0.01 
fr5 
Proportion of particles with 
diameter of 5μm 
 0.08 
fr10 
Proportion of particles with 
diameter of 10μm 
 0.59 
f Proportion tracked   0.83 
Q/A Air flow rate m/min  137 
 
Table 5-2 Fraction of released Bacillus anthracis in various locations from  
Sextro ’s paper1 (RG Sextro 2002) Vs model2 
Location 
Time(hr) 
0.5 1 4 8 24 48 
All t racked surface 1 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
All t racked surface 2 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
All untracked surface1 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
All untracked surface2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Outside1 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061 
Outside2 0.050 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
HVAC Filter1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
HVAC Filter2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
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Figure 5-1 Fraction calcu lated by model vs Sextro’s paper 
From Figure 5-1, the fate and transport model developed is in accord with that of Sext ro et al.  
The fract ions of Bacillus anthracis spores on the HVAC filter, untracked  surfaces and tracked 
surfaces are determined largely by the value of the filter removal efficiency parameter, deposition rate, 
and both the deposition rate and resuspension rate, respectively. The mass fraction rat io between 
tracked surface and untracked surface equals the proportion of tracked floor. 
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6. Discussion 
For the retrospective scenario, the risk of mortality can be linked with the concentration of Bacillus 
anthracis on different surfaces and HVAC filters. For a given risk, the larger the diameter of 
anthracis spores, the higher surface concentrations of Bacillus anthacis needed to provide a given 
risk level. For example, to reach a given risk level, the concentration of Bacillus anthacis with 
diameter of 10µm on the floor must be 80 times more than that of 1µm. This is because particles with 
larger d iameters deposit more rapidly and are more readily removed by HVAC filters, and hence 
present less risk via inhalation. 
For the prospective scenario, the risk of mortality can be linked with the surface concentration of 
Bacillus anthacis on the tracked floor since only  spores on tracked surfaces present risks in this 
scenario. As with the retrospective scenario, the larger the diameter of Bacillus anthacis spores, the 
higher the surface concentrations. For example, in order to reach the same risk o f 10-3, we have to 
release 5 t imes more Bacillus anthracis spores with a diameter of 10µm than with a diameter of 1µm. 
After comparing the distribution of Bacillus anthacis with different diameters in retrospective and 
prospective scenarios, we find that in the retrospective simulation large diameter Bacillus anthacis 
spores have a tendency to deposit on both untracked and tracked floors, midd le sized spores have the 
tendency of depositing on the walls, and small spores are more likely to be trapped by filters or exit 
the room. Small diameter particles are slow to be resuspended in the prospective simulation, and the 
larger d iameter part icles are more likely to be deposited on walls, filters, and floors in either scenario.  
For both retrospective and prospective scenario: 1) surface samples must be collected by 
micro-vacuum devices and sterile swabs which can guarantee the measured accuracy (Weis, Intrepido 
et al. 2002). The recovery of spores obtained by such devices is a concern that needs to be 
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documented quantitatively for the framework proposed here to be implemented (Sko lnick and 
Hamilton 2004) ; 2) the deposition velocity of Bacillus anthracis is a function of gravitational setting 
velocity, kinematic viscosity of air, particle turbulence, Brownian d iffusivity, shear stress and air 
density (Lai and Nazaroff 2000). Different deposition velocit ies may be appropriate for different 
buildings, and it should be possible to identify appropriate relationships between building 
characteristics and deposition velocity.  
Human nasal passages may be a good place to estimate risk since the concentration of Bacillus 
anthracis there is relat ively high due to its functioning like a filter and its compact area. However, the 
effective sampling area, sampling efficiency, and persistence of spores in this environment are major 
issues that need to be addressed in the future.  
The results of the sensitivity analyses indicated that allowable risk level is the most important factor 
for estimating appropriate concentration standards for Bacillus anthracis on untracked floor and walls; 
while Bacillus anthracis’ dose response is the second most important. Future research should be 
directed toward: 1. Reducing uncertainties in the following aspects: a) refining estimates of 
deposition velocity which are a major source of uncertain in the fate and transport computation, b) 
revising the dose-response by including time as a factor; 2. Including immune processes in the 
dose-response model; 3. Using CFD model to represent the fate and transport of bacillus anthracis. 
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Appendix 1 
1 Process of calculating C1, C2  
1.1 Retrospective risk 
In this scenario, the initial conditions are that the mass of Bacillus anthracis spores in the air equals 
the amount of the init ial release and the mass of B. anthracis on the tracked floor is zero: 

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C1 can be acquired by cancelling C2 by multip lying equation (a) by v2,2 and subtracting the product of 
equation (b) and v1,2: 
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C2 also can be acquired in the same manner, mult iplying equation (a) by v2,1 and subtracting the 
product of equation (b) and v1,1: 
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 1.2 Prospective risk 
In this scenario, all the Bacillus anthracis spores are released on the tracked floor at the beginning. 
The init ial conditions are: 
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C1 can be acquired by multip lying equation (c) by v2,2 and subtracting the product of equation (d) and 
v1,2: 
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C2 also can be acquired in the same path, mult iplying equation (c) by v2,1 and subtracting the product 
of equation (d) and v1,1: 
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2 Checking the solution of Equation (2-2) 
2.1 Validate the solution 
•
airM   
Equation (2-2) could be reparameterized using a11, a12, a21, a22 by substituting the following terms 
tfairair MaMaM 1211 +=
•
                      (e) 
tfairtf MaMaM 2221 +=
•
                       (f) 
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Qpea ++++−−−= λλλλ             (g) 
212 µ=a                             (h) 
tfa λ=21                             (i) 
222 µ−=a                            (j) 
•
airM  can be solved for after acquiring Mair from equation system e and f in Mat lab: 
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In order to valid equation k, equations (2-4) is differentiated and compared with these two 
expressions: 
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 (l) 
After comparing equation k and l, the conclusion that the solution of 
•
airM  is correct is reached.  
2.2 Validate the solution 
•
tfM   
•
tfM  also can be solved by the same route: 
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Comparing with differential equation (2-5): 
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Since equation (m) and (n) are identical, the solution to equation (2-2) is valid. 
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